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The Pentagon's Plans for 
the Philippines 
ERIK GUYOT 
The crumbling hold of the Marcos 
Government combined with the 
strategic importance ascribed to the 
Philippines make this country one of 
the major "hot spots" for U.S. policy 
makers. Yet, while news of U.S. 
military intervention in Central 
America and Lebanon fills the 
headlines, the Pentagon is quietly lay-
ing the groundwork for possible 
military intervention in America's 
largest ex-colony. 
Over the past year there has been a 
flurry of activity both in Congress and 
the Administration aimed at contain-
ing the Philippine crisis. Since last 
January, a steady stream of U.S. 
military and intelligence officials from 
the Philippines have brought back 
alarming reports on the rapid growth 
of the rural insurgency. This fall, 
House Democrats called hearings to 
determine how to "pull the rug out" 
from under these 10,000-15,000 armed 
guerrillas. For the past four months 
high-level representatives from the 
State Department, the Pentagon, 
Treasury, CIA, and other intelligence 
agencies have been meeting bi-weekly 
to formulate the U.S. response to the 
opposition movement in the Philip-
pines. 
JOI.NI' U.S. -PHIILIPPINE HILITARY DCEltCISES, HAY, 1983 
Despite this activity, however, U.S. 
policy has been marked by consider-
able flux and turmoil. Different 
branches of the Reagan Administra-
tion are pulling at Philippine policy in 
opposite directions. While the State 
Department has pressured President 
Marcos to make limited political re-
forms so as to create political space for 
the pro-U.S. elements of the opposi-
tion, at the same time the Treasury De-
partment has called for an austerity 
program which would further polarize 
Continued on page Two 
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Philippine society. When Reagan sym-
bolically cancelled a scheduled visit to 
the Philippines last fall, it appeared as 
though the U.S. was gradually distanc-
ing itself from the unpopular regime. 
But, then the great communicator tor-
pedoed the State Department's careful-
ly constructed distancing effort during 
the presidential debate when he de-
clared that he would not countenance 
''throwing them [Marcos] to the 
wolves and then facing the communist 
power in the Pacific.'' 
Throughout the bureaucratic in-
fighting over U.S. policy one actor has 
consistently had the last word on the 
Philippines. Other agencies may quar-
rell over different ''reform'' programs, 
but the Pentagon has held to the bot-
tom line position of protecting its 
military bases in the Philippines. This 
outlook is evident during Congres-
sional testimony: State Department of-
ficials equivocate about "non-inter-
ference,'' Pentagon officials are as 
blunt as is their program to transform 
the Philippine military into an effective 
counterinsurgency force. One assistant 
Secretary of Defense had no qualms in 
ref erring to $85 million worth of night 
vision devices and fire control equip-
ment as ''move, shoot, and communi-
cate items'' which would ''bolster 
counterinsurgency capabilities." 
U.S. Bases - U.S. Interests 
The Pentagon's real estate in the 
Philippines - Clark airbase and Subic 
naval base - encompass an area of ap-
proximately 25,000 acres, about twice 
the size of Manhattan. These two bases 
are unquestionably the largest and 
most important U.S. military bases 
overseas. Clark airfield serves as the 
headquarters for the 13th Air Force 
and boasts the most sophisticated gun-
nery and air combat practice range in 
Asia. Subic Bay, forward operating 
port for the U.S. carrier Task Force 77, 
is the largest naval supply base in the 
Western Pacific and is widely believed 
to be the main depot for U.S. nuclear 
weapons in the region. 
The array of training, intelligence, 
storage, and repair facilities at Clark 
and Subic, plus the 15,000 military per-
sonnel which service them, make the 
bases the fulcrum of U.S. military 
power in the Pacific. For conventional 
warfare capabilities, the bases are 
crucial for projecting power to the 
Southeast Asian mainland and the 
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Middle East. During the Vietnam war, 
Clark served as a major airlift and 
refueling center for the U.S. airwar. 
Currently, any major projection of 
force into the Middle East ultimately 
depends upon logistical support from 
Subic Bay. Sustained military action in 
the Middle East by the much heralded 
Rapid Deployment Force would rapid-
ly draw down the limited supplies posi-
tioned in the Indian Ocean and would 
require convoys of the material from 
the Philippines. Carrier task forces 
from subic are regularly deployed in 
the Persian Gulf region during Mid-
east flare-ups such as: the Iranian 
crisis, the Iraq-Iran war, and the North 
and South Yemen border war. 
Also important are the string of U.S. 
ASAT (anti-satellite) tracking stations; 
C31 (Command, Control, Communi-
cation, and Intelligence) facilities; and 
Anti-Submarine warfare stations in the 
Philippines. These facilities form an in-
tegral part of the U.S. monitoring sys-
tem which enhances U.S. nuclear war-
fighting capability by allowing selective 
"counterforce" targetting of Soviet 
missiles and submarines. While re-
moval of these facilities would not hurt 
U.S. deterrence capabilities, it would 
reduce U.S. first-strike capability. In 
addition, the strategic significance of 
these bases makes them a magnet for 
Soviet attack in the advent of a nuclear 
war: SS-20 missiles in Eastern Russia 
are targetted at these bases. 1 
Although strategic concerns have 
been paramount in determining U.S. 
policy towards the Philippines, 
economic interests are also consider-
able. Direct U.S. investment in the 
Philippines totals more than $1.3 
billion and last year's trade with the 
Philippines was $4 billion. U.S. 
business interests are most apparent in 
the so-called "export processing 
zones" or reduced tax enclaves • for 
foreign textile and semiconductor 
sweatshops, and immense U.S. banana 
and pineapple plantations. Due to the 
expansion of pineapple plantations 
such as Dole's 18,000 acre holding, one 
of every three cans of pineapples on 
supermarket shelves are from the 
Philippines. 
Finally, the military and economic 
importance of the Philippines is in-
creased by its role in providing 
"stability" for "America's New Fron-
tier" - the Pacific Rim. Stretching 
from Australian and Micronesia up 
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through Southeast Asia, China, South 
Korea, and Japan this dynamic area is 
the fastest growing region of U.S. 
trade, having outstripped Europe four 
years ago. Due to its location on the 
South China Sea, Pentagon officials 
point out that the Philippines controls 
both the vital sea lanes to mineral rich 
Southeast Asia and oil supply routes to 
Japan. 
Following the assassination of op-
position leader Benigno Aquino Jr. on 
August 21, 1983, Washington focused 
its attention on the urban unrest spark-
ed by the killing. The assassination 
stripped away whatever remaining 
legitimacy the Marcos government 
had, pushing a large segment of the 
middle classes and business classes into 
active opposition for the first time. 
Soon a loose working coalition be-
tween the popular opposition and the 
pro-U .S. elite opposition developed. In 
response, Washington sought to split 
that coalition and isolate the left 
through a two-tracked program. 
The first track consisted of pressure 
on Marcos from the State Department 
and Congress to set up an ''indepen-
dent" commission to investigate the 
assassination. Although the stated pur-
pose of the commission was to bring 
Aquino's killers to justice, its primary 
aim was not justice per se but to diffuse 
the increasingly militant assassination 
Continued on page Six 
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Nicaraguan Elections: 
Whose Sham? 
MARTIN DISKIN 
0 n November 4th, the Nicaraguan 
people went to the polls to elect a Presi-
dent, Vice-President, and a ninety-six 
member National Assembly. The Rea-
gan administration has professed great 
support for elections in certain places, 
but not in Nicaragua. United States 
support for democracy in Nicaragua is 
expressed by its creation, financing and 
training of the contras whose constant 
attacks on the civilian population have 
"neutralized" numerous women, 
children, and agricultural workers. The 
U.S. has sabotaged diplomatic peace 
initiatives, and has engaged in an 
economic boycott ostensibly to con-
vince the Nicaraguans to hold an elec-
tion. When an election was announced, 
Washington did its best to prevent it 
from occuring. It started a campaign 
of villification and other efforts, in-
cluding bribery, to prevent participa-
tion of Nicaraguan parties. Who's 
shamming here? 
Nicaraguan voters await the opening of the polls 
The Nicaraguan election represents 
the fulfillment of a promise. Not, ac-
cording to Kirkpatrick, a promise 
made to~ the OAS about creating a 
liberal, mildly reformist regime after 
overthrowing Somoza in 1979. Rather, 
it was the promise made by Daniel 
Ortega in a speech to the Nicaraguan 
people on August 23, 1980. At that 
time he said that elections would occur 
within five years. He further stated 
that preparations would be begun in 
1983. Both promises have been kept. 
The election came a bit earlier than 
stated, primarily for defensive reasons. 
Because of the mounting hostility from 
the United States, the Sandinistas may 
have felt that scheduling it two days 
before the American election might 
deter any American aggression because 
of the presidential campaign here. Al-
so, it might be a bit harder to invade 
Nicaragua after they held a valid elec-
tion. 
The U.S. fostered attack on the 
Nicaraguan elections had such little ef-
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f ect that a more insidious and provoca-
tive effort was begun. The leaked story 
about MIG's arriving in Nicaragua re-
presented the next stage of hostility 
against a country that dared hold an 
election not approved by Washington. 
The Anti-Election Campaign 
The efforts to discredit and under-
mine the election began even before the 
February 1984 announcement of the 
November date. In December of 1983, 
after the first announced intention of 
holding elections, a list of nine points, 
stated as ''requirements for authentic 
elections" was published by a coalition 
of opposition groups, the Coordina-
dora. This coalition included four con-
servative opposition parties (the Social 
Christian party [PSC], The Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party [PLC], Social 
Democratic Party [PSD], and the 
Nicaraguan Conservative Party 
[PCN], not legally recognized), the 
private sector council (COSEP), two 
small trade union federations, the 
Catholic Church hierarchy, and the op-
position newspaper, La Prensa. 
Among the points were demands con-
cerning conditions for campaigning 
such as access to the media, abolition 
of censorship, and relaxation of 
emergency restrictions on freedom of 
assembly. These demands were almost 
completely met. In addition, however, 
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the list included points that implied a 
thorough overhaul of the political 
system as a precondition for par-
ticipating. They demanded a separa-
tion of the FSLN (the Sandinista party) 
from the state, particularly with regard 
to the Army, the police, television, and 
mass organizations such as the CDS' s 
(Sandinista Defense Committees). 
They also called for a repeal of certain 
laws that nationalized private proper-
ty. Most provocative to the San-
dinistas, however, was the demand that 
the government negotiate directly 
with the leadership of the contras. 
The Sandinistas had already declared 
an amnesty for the vast majority of 
contra fighters but had refused to 
negotiate with the contra leadership 
that had made no bones about its open 
support for the Somoza regime. This 
point was immediately and definitely 
rejected. 
In late July, the Coordinadora 
named Arturo Cruz and Adan Fletes as 
their candidates for president and vice-
president. Cruz, who has lived outside 
of Nicaragua for the last ten years, 
served as Nicaragua's ambassador in 
Washington for several months, and at 
that time was an officer of the Inter-
American Development Bank in Wash-
ington. Immediately on arriving in 
Continued on page Four 
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Managua on July 22, 1984, he an-
nounced that the Coordinadora would 
not participate in the election unless 
the December 1983 nine points were 
agreed to. He further stressed the de-
mand that the contra leaders be in-
duded in a dialogue as a "basic condi-
tion." Three days later, on the dead-
line for registration of parties, after 
conversation with the American am-
bassador, he stated that the coor-
dinadora would boycott the elections. 
Cruz's actions convinced many people 
that his sole purpose for returning to 
Nicaragua was to discredit the electoral 
process. Although he was not an of-
ficial candidate, Cruz traveled through 
Nicaragua holding campaign rallies. At 
some of these rallies, supporters of the 
coordinadora and FSLN youth 
clashed. 
Still, the coordinadora publicly 
demanded a postponement of the elec-
tion. A round of negotiations began in 
Rio de Janeiro at a meeting of the 
Socialist International, mediated by 
Willy Brandt. Although it appeared 
that an agreement was close, negotia-
tions abruptly ended with a govern-
ment announcement that the elections 
would continue as planned without the 
coordinadora. In those discussions, the 
Sandinistas considered a postponement 
of the election to permit the coor-
dinadora to enter the race. By this time 
the coordinadora had dropped its de-
mand that the contras be included and 
appeared to be offering to mediate a 
cease-fire of the contras in return. 
However many observers are con-
vinced that the coordinadora had no 
intention of participating in the elec-
tions since its December 1983 declara-
tion. Further, although Cruz may per-
sonally disapprove of the contras, the 
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Participating Parties and Share of the Vote-1984 
#of votes 
(President) 
735,967 
154,327 
105,560 
61,199 
16,034 
14,494 
11,352 
71,209 
1,170,142 
OJo of 
Valid Votes 
67.0 
14.0 
9.6 
5.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.0 
100.0 
parties he represented would never 
have agreed to support or arrange a 
cease fire. Cruz himself called the con-
tras ''our esteemed fellow citizens who 
chose the route of war,'' after a one-
hour meeting with Secretary of State 
George Shultz on October 30, five days 
before the election. 
The Parties 
Seven political parties were repre-
sented in the election (see box), three to 
the right of the Sandinistas and three to 
the left. One of them, the Liberal In-
dependent Party (PLI) announced near 
the end of the campaign that it was 
withdrawing from the election. Its 
presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy 
stated that free elections were not 
possible. Still, the vice-presidential 
candidate Constantino Pereira, and 
many PLI candidates for the National 
Assembly, as well as many regional 
party committees, continued to cam-
paign and supported participation. Al-
though the decision to withdraw was a 
party decision, the necessary step, that 
of submitting a letter of withdrawal to 
the Supreme Electoral Commission 
(CSE), was not done until after the 
ballots were printed and distributed to 
the regional polling centers. This 
hesitation represented a deep split in 
the party and insufficient unanimity to 
withdraw. When it still seemed that the 
PLI would not run, its vice-presidential 
candidate went on television and in the 
newspapers to say that he was not with-
drawing and continued to seek votes. 
He told me that only by participating 
could he and his party have any influ-
ence on the process. Further, he felt 
that withdrawing would only en-
courage certain elements in the U.S. to 
believe they could invade. 
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Assembly Seats 
61 
14 
9 
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2 
2 
2 
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United States diplomats were very 
active during the campaign. They in-
cluded Langhorne Motley, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, and Harry Schlaudeman, 
special envoy for Central America. 
Ambassador Harry Bergold and his 
political officer, J. Michael Joyce, 
freely and frequently expressed the 
wish of the United States government 
that the opposition parties of the right 
refuse to participate as the coor-
dinadora had done. However, this 
meddling did not stop with advice. In 
an interview with the presidential can-
didate of the Conservative Democratic 
Party (PCD), Dr. Clemente Guido, he 
told me that several of his party's 
leaders had been offered money by the 
U.S. embassy. When I asked him if 
these "persuasions," as he called 
them, matched the amount of money 
each party received from the national 
electoral commission, he said that since 
it was in dollars, it was much more 
than the 9 million cordobas. The U.S., 
on the one hand, created a barrage of 
invective toward the Sandinistas, in-
sisting that they hold elections, but also 
tried to abort them by dirty tricks. So-
meone is shamming, indeed! 
The Election 
Ninety-three percent of the eligible 
voters in Nicaragua had registered in a 
four-day campaign last July. On Nov. 
4th the procedure for voting consisted of 
presenting the registration card to 
verify eligibility; receiving a ballot, 
marking it inside a booth, and 
depositing it in a box; dipping one's 
finger in red ink; turning in the card; 
and leaving. The members of the elec-
tion board (Junta Receptora de Votos) 
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Sandinista Candidate Ortega 
were very well trained. Each voter was 
given verbal instructions stressing the 
maintenance of secrecy and the 
freedom to vote for the party of ones 
choice. The ballot was completely 
secret, sometimes behind a curtain or 
in a seperate room. In the eleven poll-
ing places I visited during the day, 
there were no disturbances. Voters 
freely expressed their ideas about the 
vote, including some strong opposition 
sentiments from people who were not 
voting. 
Contrasting this election with the 
two rounds of voting I witnessed last 
March and May in El Salvador, there 
was a notably freer atmosphere in 
Nicaragua than in El Salvador. None 
of the pre-election conflict even vague-
ly matched the lethal violence that is a 
regular feature of politics in El Salva-
dor. In Nicaragua, all parties of the op-
.position that wished to participate did 
so. In El Salvador, opposition groups' 
security could not be guaranteed 
against death squad activity, even by 
the government. 
The election campaign was more 
focused on issues in Nicaragua. In El 
Salvador, it consisted of invective, in-
sult, and threat. The voting public 
learned little in the Salvadoran cam-
paign except that hatred separated the 
contending parties and candidates. In 
El Salvador, in part because each 
citizen must prove he or she voted on 
request from the police and the army 
by showing a stamp on ones ID card, 
people went to the polls in large num-
bers. Once there, their vote was hardly 
secret, since the ballot boxes were 
transparent and people were usually 
milling in the vicinity. Many voters in 
the lines in Nicaragua expressed a sen-
timent I did not hear in El Salvador 
when they said that this was the first 
free election they had attended. 
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Consequences 
It was clear from observing this elec-
tion that it was, as a delegation of the 
Latin American Studies Association 
stated in their report, "a model of pro-
bity and fairness." This seemed to be 
the overwhelming view of the numer-
ous observers from Europe and Latin 
America. In short, the Reagan ad-
ministration claim that this was a 
"Soviet style sham," although freely 
reported in the press, failed to convince 
any serious observer. This election 
gave a mandate of 63 OJo of the vote to 
the FSLN as well as institutionalizing 
an opposition with tnore than a third 
of the seats in the National Assembly. 
Many points of procedure and policy 
have already been negotiated between 
the FSLN and other parties not only as 
a result of the election, but during the 
party summit held in October. More 
discussions continued during the na-
tional dialogue that included over thir-
ty interest groups from all social sec-
tors. The Sandinista social and politi-
cal project, definitely socialist in 
nature, is being defined in a way re-
flecting the special attributes of that 
country. Although under great stress 
from the United States, Nicaragua has 
succeeded in taking the first step in 
building a new social system. For that, 
Washington believes it should suffer. 
Beginning on election day, stories 
leaked from the Pentagon about al-
leged MIG's appeared to whip up the 
American people into a frame of mind 
sympathetic to further aggression. The 
defeated Democrats, apparently 
unwilling to oppose Reagan on the 
Central America issue both during and 
after the campaign, rushed to outdo 
each other in warlike statements. Sen. 
Tsongas said that if there were MIGs 
in the crates, ''we would have to take 
them out." 
The U.S. has given lip service to 
diplomacy only in order to hide its real 
military intentions. When Nicaragua 
agreed to sign the Contadora draft 
treaty on October 15th, the Reagan ad-
ministration became the laughing stock 
of the international community as it 
suddenly discovered that the treaty was 
"deficient." When the U.S. loses a 
round in this way, it turns ugly. 
Nicaragua may now be in greater dan-
ger than ever because the U.S. is fast 
abandoning the pretense that it favors 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict 
or that it is willing to reach a political 
understanding with the Sandinistas. 
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Significantly, various solidarity 
groups, and many other concerned 
people, have begun mobilizing to pre-
vent a possible escalation of violence 
against Nicaragua. Reminiscent of the 
pledge to resist illegitimate authority 
around which Resist was founded, 
there is a new pledge to engage in re-
sistance if there is an escalation in Cen-
tral America. Congress has proven a 
thin reed against administration 
manipulation. Perhaps in some new 
committee assignments (Senate In-
telligence Oversight) the Reagan ad-
ministration's desire to make war in 
Central America can be slowed down. 
But the real message that Washington 
may heed is that we will not permit 
another United States juggernaut to 
roll over a poor third world country 
trying to liberate itself. By resisting our 
government's perverse application of 
power, as we did in Vietnam, we might 
begin to give voice to the many 
Americans who were so poorly 
represented in the last election. 
Martin Diskin, a professor of an-
thropology at M.I. T., is a long-time 
friend of Resist. He has written exten-
sively about Central America including 
his latest book entitled, Trouble in Our 
Back Yard: Central America and the 
United States in the I 980's. Published 
by Pantheon Books, 1984. 
Note: For an extensive analysis of the 
current situation in Honduras, we en-
courage Resist readers to contact the 
Christie Institute which recently 
published a tabloid entitled: 
Honduras: A Look at the Reality. 
Their address is 1324 North Capitol St. 
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 
797-8106 
HELP WANTED: 
RED SUN PRESS, A COLLEC-
TIVELY-RUN, HIGH QUALITY 
PRINT SHOP IS LOOKING FOR A 
PRESS OPERATOR AND A STRIP-
PER, WITH AT LEAST TWO 
YEARS EXPERIENCE. MUST 
HA VE COMMITMENT TO ANTI-
CAPITALIST POLITICS. CALL 
RED SUN PRESS, M-F, 9-5:30, 
617-524-6822 
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Phillipines 
Continued from page Two 
protests. The commission Marcos 
· chose, and especially its chair, retired 
justice Corazon Agrava, seemed well 
suited for the task. Its extreme reluc-
tance to investigate too closely to Mar-
cos for fear of the resulting political 
turmoil was well expressed in Agrava's 
bed time prayers: "I'm not asking you 
necessarily, Lord, to tell us who pulled 
the trigger or who was behind who 
pulled the trigger. But please, please, 
lead us to a conclusion that will bring 
peace and harmony to my Filipino 
brothers and sisters.'' 
The second, and more important 
track, was pressure from the State 
Department for the elite opposition to 
participate in the May 1984 National 
Assembly elections. Immediately after 
the August assassination virtually 
every segment of the opposition had 
announced that it would boycott the 
upcoming elections rather than grant 
the Marcos regime legitimacy since the 
National Assembly held no real power 
and fair elections were impossible as 
long as Marcos ruled by decree. 
But after years of claiming that 
demands for free elections in the 
Philippines would constitute undue in-
tervention, the State Department be-
gan pressuring Marcos for some 
limited election reforms and launched 
an intense lobbying effort to persuade 
the elite opposition to participate. As 
to whether the election was intended to 
result in any real power sharing, State 
Department officials predicted that 
Marcos would allow the opposition to 
win at most 30-40 seats out of 200. 
Central to this two-track strategy was 
the perception that the U.S. could 
distance itself from Marcos and 
pressure him to make significant con-
cessions to the elite opposition. 2 
Last Spring that strategy seemed to 
be working. In February, State Depart-
ment officials were pleased to note that 
the Agrava commission ''has con-
tributed significantly to lowering the 
political temperature of the country 
over the past months." The unex-
pected success of the moderate opposi-
tion in gaining 60 seats despite massive 
fraud seemed to confirm that Marcos 
would continue the process of slowly 
opening up the political system to the 
elite opposition. 
Things soon went awry, however. 
Public pressure on the Agrava commis-
sion forced it to probe closer to Marcos 
than intended, yet it was widely 
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criticized as a whitewash for not impli-
cating Marcos himself. Marcos' refusal 
to share power with the opposition in 
the National Assembly and his con-
tinued use of decree making powers ap-
peared to vindicate the position of the 
boycott movement. By September, the 
main political arena was not the Na-
tional Assembly and its handful of op-
position members, but the "parliament 
of the streets" and its thousands of 
demonstrators. 
U.S. Policy at Cross-Purposes 
Marcos' s refusal to share power 
brought the divergent aims of the 
various branches of U.S. policy mak-
ing bureaucracy more sharply into con-
flict. The State Department's policy of 
opening up the political system a bit 
and building the base of the elite op-
position rested upon reversing the 
political polarization fueled by the 
economic crisis. Thus the State Depart-
ment pushed for the accelerated 
disbursement of last year's $50 millitm 
in economic assistance to bail out the 
Philippine financial system. 
Since the State Department views the 
Philippine crisis as primarily economic 
and political in origin, not military, it 
looked favorably upon the plan of 
Rep. Stephen Solarz for a massive 
economic aid package to the Philip-
pines. This proposal by the influential 
chair of the House Asian and Pacific 
Affairs sub-committee for a "Shultz 
Plan" would pump billions of aid into 
the Philippines provided Marcos open-
ed up the economic and political 
system to free competition. 
In contrast, the Treasury depart-
ment, more attuned to the interests of 
the U.S. financial community, has 
prescribed a tough IMF austerity pro-
gram to insure payment of the Philip-
pines' $30 billion foreign debt. Skep-
tical of Marcos' intentions to · fully 
comply with the IMF program, at one 
point Treasury took the almost unpre-
cedented step of vetoing a $150 million 
World Bank agriculture loan to the 
Philippines. While State lobbied hard 
for the sorely needed fertilizer and 
pesticide funds, Treasury prevailed and 
the U.S. 's symbolic vote against the 
loan sent shock waves throughout 
Manila. 
A clear example of the Treasury 
Department's austerity program and 
the State Department's process of 
political "normalization" working at 
cross purposes came last June. Key 
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elements of the IMF program that 
Treasury backed were a devaluation of 
the peso and increasing consumer 
taxes. In exchange the IMF would pro-
vide the Philippines with a $630 million 
bridging loan and its stamp of ap-
proval needed to unlock $ .16 billion in 
private bank loans. To fulfill the tax 
requirement, Marcos secretly filed two 
decrees raising taxes which immediate-
ly caused an uproar in Manila. Less 
than one month after the elections 
which supposedly signalled the end to 
Marcos' use of decree making powers, 
the President had subverted the process 
towards "normalcy" to comply with 
the pending IMF agreement. A similar 
situation occured in October, when 
barely 7 days after the IMF agreement 
was signed, new gas taxes demanded by 
the IMO touched off a massive transit 
strike throughout the Philippines. 
Meanwhile, Pentagon officials 
argued before Congress that although 
economic and political reforms were 
important, "there is a military element 
to the Philippine government's 
response which is essential and cannot 
be ignored." Thus while Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage 
praised Chairman Solarz's New York 
Times Op-Ed piece on the "Shultz 
Plan" as "very helpful" he strenuous-
ly objected to Solarz's proposal to shift 
some of the $85 million in military aid 
to economic aid. 
The 98th Congress did change the 
figures on the Administration's aid 
package of $180 million in combined 
economic and military aid by setting 
military aid at $40 million and eco-
nomoc aid at $140 million. That Con-
gress blocked $45 million of the Pen-
tagon's military aid request was due to 
a concerted lobbying effort by anti-in-
terventionist and Philippine human 
rights groups. For while Solarz was 
maneuvering for basically cosmetic 
shifts in U.S. aid, he was also fighting 
off an amendment by Rep. Tony Hall 
of Ohio to cut all military aid to the 
Philippines. Despite intense opposition 
from Solarz and other congressional 
leaders, the Hall amendment had sur-
prising strength garnering 149 votes. 
Although this year Pentagon of-
ficials received 'only' $40 million in 
military aid (roughly two-thirds the 
level sent to El Salvador last year), the 
prospects for further increases look 
good. For one, the mechanics of a $900 
million rent agreement for the U.S. 
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military bases (split 50-50 economic 
and military) mean that a decrease in 
military aid one year automatically 
causes an increase in subsequent years. 
Moreover, the bottom line assessment 
both in Congress and the Reagan Ad-
ministration is that since the U.S. 
military bases must stay any threat to 
the bases must be crushed. 
The dispute between Congress and 
the Administration is over tactics: re-
presenting cold war liberals, Rep. 
Solarz believes in primarily economic 
and political solutions to "pull the rug 
out" from under a growing insurgen-
cy; the Pentagon wants a military solu-
tion. Thus Congressman Solarz's Op-
Ed piece was indeed "very helpful" to 
the Pentagon since it was the first salvo 
by the mainstream media in raising the 
spector of the New People's Army. 
The New People's Army (NPA) is 
the fastest growing insurgency in Asia, 
if not the world. Numbering approx-
imately 10,000 armed regulars, the 
NP A can call upon another 10,000 ir-
regular forces and an estimated 
200,000 active supporters. (For com-
parison, FMLN guerrillas in El 
Salvador number some 9-12,000.) Al-
though the NP A is formally the armed 
wing of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, most of its members are 
drawn from the rural poor and tribal 
minorities. Pentagon officials such as 
Armitage frankly acknowledge that 
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economic injustices and abuse by the 
Philippine military are the main source 
of NP A popular support. As for arms, 
the Pentagon admits that the NP A 
receives ''no apparent external sup-
port" and that its indigenous nature 
''is one of the most troubling aspects 
of the insurgency.'' 
Over the years NP A activity has in-
creased so that it now operates in 53 of 
the Philippines' 73 provinces and effec-
tively controls 20% of all Philippine 
villages. In the past, the NP A took ad-
vantage of the Philippines' rugged ter-
rain and numerous islands by 
operating in small, highly mobile units. 
Now activity has been stepped up to in-
clude larger sized units of up to 100 
guerrillas. Some sources predict that 
within two years, the NP A will have 
achieved rough parity with the Philip-
pine military. Pentagon officials also 
warn that if present trends continue, 
''the balance of power could favor the 
insurgents within the next several 
years." 
The Pentagon's Counterinsurgency 
Program 
U.S. policy entered a new phase and 
focused on the countryside when 
Washington was jolted by alarming 
reports on the NPA's growth. In 
August, Admiral William Crowe Jr., 
CINCPAC commander of all U.S. 
forces in the Pacific, returned from a 
fact finding tour of the Philippines. 
Crowe, perhaps one of the most influ-
ential shapers of U.S. policy for the 
Pacific, was reportedly ''very distress-
ed'' with the poor performance of the 
Philippine military. 
At Admiral Crowe's insistence, a 
high-level interagency task force was 
established in August to map out a 
response to the insurgency. The task 
forces' representatives from the State 
Department, Pentagon, Treasury, and 
intelligence agencies are expected to 
soon forward their classified report to 
the National Security Council. Some 
observers point out that the emergence 
of similar interagency groups in the 
early 1960s preceded the decision for 
massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam. 
The type of military aid currently 
sent to the Philippines and the U.S. ef-
forts with the Salvadoran military sug-
gest the basic contours of the Pen-
tagon's counterinsurgency program. 
As in El Salvador, the Pentagon seeks 
to "professionalize" the Philippine 
military by removing the so-called 
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political generals who are "affected by 
bad habits of corruption'' and replac-
ing them with combat seasoned Jr. of-
ficers. Thus, last month's removal of 
Philippine Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian 
Ver, because of his role in the Aquino 
assassination, and his replacement by 
the West Point-trained Fidel Ramos 
was probably well received by the Pen-
tagon. 
Until recently, the Philippine 
military relied on strategic hamletting 
to contain the NPA and the Muslin 
seperatist Moro National Liberation 
Front, subjecting some 500,000 
Filipinos to that process. Now, how-
ever, the Philippine military no longer 
has the capacity for such troop-inten-
sive programs, but instead conducts 
large-scale sweeps. The main com-
ponents of U.S. aid - aircraft, light 
armored vehicles, and amphibious 
vehicles - are geared towards pro-
viding the mobility and firepower 
necessary for these sweeps. U.S. 
military analysts are probably watch-
ing El Salvador's new air war with 700 
man mobile helicopter battalions and 
its applicability to the Philippines. 
Another aspect of the counterin-
surgency program U.S. military of-
ficials want the Philippines to imple-
ment are ''training programs to 
sharpen counterguerrilla warfare 
skills." Not long after the U.S. had, in 
its words, "relayed our concerns," 
Philippine Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Emile unveiled a new four-point 
counterinsurgency plan. 
If these new efforts by the Philippine 
military fail, the U.S. may seek closer 
coordination with its personnel at 
Clark and Subic. In the mid-l 970s 
Green Berets from Clark engaged in 
small scale "civic actions" in guerrilla 
areas. Back then, Clark airfield also 
provided logistical and air support for 
the Philippine military. In addition, 
the annual joint U .S.-Philippine 
maneuvers have been stepped-up in re-
cent years. 
The mere presence of the U.S. bases 
in the Philippines would make direct 
U.S. military intervention relatively 
easy logistically. Direct intervention, 
should it occur, would likely begin with 
incremental steps, but with the position 
of the U.S. bases, it could escalate 
rapidly. Given the Reagan Administra-
tion's propensity for gunboats over 
diplomacy, the temptation for military 
Continued on page Eight 
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San Diego County Draft Resisters 
Defense Fund, PO Box 33544, San 
Diego, CA 92103. 
In September the Draft Resisters 
Defense Fund (DRDF) submitted a 
proposal to us on behalf of the Pro-
ject on Youth and Non-Military Op-
portunities (YANO). Project YANO 
was initiated by a coalition of groups 
with a long history of anti-military 
activity. Among these groups are San 
Diego CARD, San Diego National 
Lawyers Guild Chapter, the DRDF 
and the San Diego Peace Resource 
Center. Because of their anti-military 
activities, these groups had en-
countered difficulties in gaining ac-
ceptance for their work in high 
schools. The purpose of project 
YANO is to increase the effectiveness 
of their outreach work in high 
schools and to young people. Some 
of the goals of project Y ANO are to 
challenge the presence of military re-
cruiters and Selective Serive personnel 
in high schools; to educate young 
people on issues of draft registration, 
poverty draft, militarism and the 
Solomon amendments; and reduce the 
effectiveness of the poverty draft. 
Additionally, those at project Y ANO 
hope to promote networking among 
community and student groups. Some 
strategies for obtaining these goals 
are to gain equal access for counter 
draft and recruitment materials in 
schools, and to institute a campaign 
against high school use of Armed Ser-
vices Vocational Aptitude Battery 
Test. Project YANO will use Resist's 
grant to produce a brochure on non-
military opportunities for youth, in-
cluding Solomon alternatives. 
Great Speckled Bird, PO Box 4532, 
Atlanta, GA 30302. 
The Bird, Atlanta's progressive 
monthly, is back in print and looking 
better than ever! The Bird was 
originally established in 1968, the im-
petus for its founding growing out of 
mounting opposition to the Vietnam 
War and the recognition that the 
southern "establishment" press did 
not cover subjects that challenged the 
local business elite. For seven years 
the Bird was the voice for anti-war, 
civil rights, feminist, gay and en-
vironmental concerns in Atlanta. And 
once again, the Bird is pitting itself 
against the establishment press and 
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the local business community. 
Numerous community organizations, 
a progressive city council and a 
strong civil rights tradition are the in-
gredients which make it possible for 
the Bird to fly again. In the first 
several issues - which are published 
monthly - the Great Speckled Bird 
printed articles on '' Abortion Bigots 
Hit Feminist Clinic" (Sep. '84), 
"Arab Rights Attacked on West 
Bank" (Sep. '84), 'Is El Salvador 
Spanish for Viet Nam?" (Aug. '84), 
and "Inside the Democratic Conven-
tion" (Aug. '84), as well as articles 
on numerous, and controversial, local 
issues. Resist wishes the Bird many 
successful years in print and hope the 
headliner which they purchased with 
our grant makes their work go a little 
smoother. 
Federation for Progress, PO Box 
2132, Gary, IN 46409. 
The Gary chapter of the Federation 
for Progress (FFP) and its affiliates: 
Calumet Women United Against 
Rape, Calumet Unemployed Workers 
Center, Gary Welfare Rights 
Organization and Women's Action 
for Nuclear Disarmament have won 
the reputation in Gary of being grass-
roots fighters and winners as a result 
of thir struggles with local utilities, 
the welfare department, against home 
foreclosures and for their strong 
stand for peace and justice. FFP has 
called successful demonstrations that 
have won the support of local labor 
unions, women's groups and others 
working for social justice. Resist's 
grant helped FFP set up their office 
and produce a brochure about their 
work. 
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intervention will increase as . the 
strength of the opposition movement 
continues to build. 
(Next month, the Philippine opposi-
tion) 
Erik Guyot is the Co-Director of the 
Congressional Liaison Unit of the 
Philippine Support Committee. For 
more information please write to: 
Philippine Support Committee, 1346 
Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 533, 
Washington, DC 20036. 
Resist News/el/er 
1. A comprehensive analysis of the 
U.S. bases is provided in "U.S. 
Military Bases in the Philippines'' 
available for $2.50 through Philippine 
Support Committee, or Asia Resource 
Center, P.O. Box 15275, Washington 
D.C., 20003. 
2. For a thorough analysis of the 
Philippine elections see 
"U.S.-Sponsored Elections in El 
Salvador and the Philippines,'' 
Walden Bello and Edward S. Herman, 
(World Policy Journal, Summer 1984). 
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